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Introduction
Human cloning, the caning of teen vandals, and the belief that
aliens descend from space to abduct humans and livestock all hold
something in common: they are more popular than Congress.1 With
the 112th Congress bottoming out at a record-low 9% approval rating, it is clear that Americans are deeply unsatisfied with the gridlock
gripping Washington.2 While it is popular, and even easy, to lambaste
Republicans for blanket obstructionism and to condemn Democrats for
failure to stand up to minority bullying, collective blame shifting will
not breach the dam of a hyper-partisan Congress.3 Instead, individuals
hoping to get Congress moving again must look for small changes to
procedure that will result in large outcomes in terms of party comity
and legislative efficiency. Underlying the partisan gridlock has been the
growing use and abuse of the filibuster, a Senate procedural anomaly
that allows even a single senator to bring legislation to an indefinite halt.4
J.D. cum laude, American University Washington College of Law, 2012. B.A. with Honors Stanford
University, 2009. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Professor William Yeomans, without
whom my interest in Senate procedural rules would never have been born and this piece would have
never come into existence.

*

1
See Rosalind Helderman & Peyton Craighill, Congress Less Popular Than, Well, So Many Things,
The Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/whatscongress-less-popular-than-among-other-things-human-cloning/2011/08/09/gIQAznM26I_story.
html; Lucy Madison, Congressional Approval at All-Time Low of 9%, According to New CBS News/
New York Times Poll, CBS News, Dec. 2, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20125482503544/congressional-approval-at-all-time-low-of-9-according-to-new-cbs-news-new-york-timespoll/?tag=cbsnewsMainColumnArea (showing that congressional approval ratings dropped into the
single digits for the first time in the history of the CBS/New York Times poll).
2
Madison, supra note 1.
3
E.g., Ari Berman, GOP Obstructionism Reaches New Heights, The Nation (June 1, 2011, 12:26 PM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/161059/gop-obstructionism-reaches-new-heights.
4
See Martin Gold, Senate Procedure and Practice 49 (2nd ed. 2008).
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At the start of the 112th Congress, all returning Democratic senators
signed a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid urging filibuster
reform.5 However, reforms failed to materialize and the obstructionism
continued just as adamantly as before.6 As the 113th Congress is elected
and prepares to head to Washington in January 2013, it must look to
directly address the threat of filibuster abuse or risk continued legislative obstructionism and political polarization.
This Article will examine the potential avenues for reform in the
113th Congress by exploring the efficacy of several options for filibuster
reform and determine whether the incoming Congress would realistically enact them. Part II of this Article will look at the evolution of the
filibuster as a tool for delay and obstruction in the Senate and examine
the modern day problems of continued growth in filibuster threats and
use. Parts III and IV will propose and examine calls for reform, both in
the form of hard rule reform as well as soft compromises. Finally, Part
V will present a determination and conclusion addressing the potential
for legislative procedural reform that can be enacted in the immediate
future.
I. The Filibuster
History and Evolution
Senate decorum and procedure are governed by the Senate Rules,
a set of rules agreed upon at the beginning of each new Congress.7 The
filibuster came into existence more as an accidental effect of procedural
rulemaking than through deliberate planning.8 In 1789, the first Senate
adopted rules allowing the Senate “to move the previous question”
which would end debate on a particular issue and allow it to proceed
to a vote.9 Some senators argued that the rule was unnecessary and
5
Dan Friedman, Senate’s Returning Democrats Unanimously Favor Filibuster Reform,
National Journal (Nov. 30, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/
senate-s-returning-democrats-unanimously-favor-filibuster-reform-20101222.
6
Manu Raju, Filibuster Reform Goes Bust, Politico, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0111/48325.html.
7
See Standing Rules of the Senate (2011); see also Tom Udall, The Constitutional Option: Reforming
the Rules of the Senate to Restore Accountability and Reduce Gridlock, 5 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 115, 116-17
(2011) (discussing the process of establishing and amending the Senate Rules); U.S.Const. art. I, § 5
(“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”). These rules are most often carried over,
leading to some contentions that the rules are “continuous” and not newly adopted. See infra Part IV.
8
This paper will focus on the “modern” use of the filibuster. The scholarship surrounding the history
of the filibuster is impressive in its breadth. See generally Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Is the
Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245 (2010) (examining the modern filibuster in comparison
to past versions and uses of the filibuster); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 181, 187-93 (1997) (discussing the formational history of the filibuster in the 18th and
19th centuries); Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and
Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to over Come the Filibuster, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 205 (2004) (laying
out the evolution of the filibuster from creation through the present).
9
See Gold, supra note 4, at 48 (stating the rules of the U.S. Senate).
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pushed for its elimination.10 In 1806, the Senate agreed and repealed
the motion to move the previous question, thereby creating the potential for a filibuster to occur because there was no longer a mechanism
that could formally end debate.11 While the filibuster was rarely used
in its infancy, several prominent senators of the early 19th century recognized the potential for problems and pushed to enact restrictions on
debate.12 Ultimately, their efforts failed to establish concrete rules.13
In 1917, the Senate adopted the first formalized restrictions on the
filibuster in the form of a rule allowing senators to call for the cloture of
debate.14 This rule came in response to a successful filibuster by twelve
senators that blocked President Woodrow Wilson’s immensely popular
efforts to arm merchant ships against German U-Boat attacks during
World War I.15 To prevent the future derailment of popular policy by
unrestricted filibuster, the Senate invoked the precursor to the modern
Senate Rule XXII, a cloture vote which could, with the assent of twothirds of members, end debate and move a measure to a vote.16
A. The Filibuster Today: Practice and Problems
Rule XXII evolved a great deal throughout the 20th century, with
shifting restrictions and vote requirements.17 The modern version
requires a three-fifths majority to invoke cloture, a process that itself
takes several Senate business days to complete.18 To bring a cloture
motion, a senator must first find fifteen additional signatories and submit a motion to invoke cloture to the Presiding Officer of the Senate.19
This motion then matures for a full calendar day before it is brought to
a vote.20 If the cloture motion wins a three-fifths majority — 60 senators
— then cloture is invoked.21 However, invoking cloture does not bring
an immediate end to debate; the filibustering senator(s) are allowed
thirty more hours of debate before they must cease, and only then is a
Id. at 49.
Id.
12
See id. (detailing plans proposed by multiple senators to either re-adopt the motion to move the
previous question or adopt new, stricter time limits on debate).
13
Id.
14
See Fisk, supra note 8, at 196 (discussing the evolution of filibusters that caused the implementation
of the cloture rule).
15
Id. See also Thomas W. Ryley, A Little Group of Willful Men (1975) (telling the story of the opposition to President Wilson’s proposal and the political drama that unfolded).
16
See 55 Cong. Rec. 45 (1917) (cataloguing the debate over implementation of Rule XXII).
17
See Fisk, supra note 8, at 199-210 (discussing the evolution of the filibuster from 1930 to present,
including decreases in vote totals required for cloture invocation and the implementation of the “two
track” system which allowed to Senate to conduct other business during a filibuster); Gold, supra note
8, at 216-18 (describing the early filibusters of the last 19th century).
18
See Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXII (2) (2011).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
10
11
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filibuster truly broken, allowing the measure to move along to its next
procedural obligation.22
The exercise of a filibuster is relatively straightforward. At any
point in time, a senator can invoke the long-standing Senate tradition
of unlimited debate merely by choosing to exercise it. This effectively
delays a measure until the filibuster has ended, either voluntarily or by
the invocation of cloture.23 A senator can engage in a filibuster on any
particular motion, such as a motion to bring a bill up for debate or the
motion to proceed to a vote, effectively allowing themselves multiple
bites at the apple. This gives senators the opportunity to filibuster a
piece of legislation several times in its path through the Senate, costing
precious time and grinding progress to a halt.24
The filibuster, in its present form, is no longer “part of an age-old
and inviolate Senate tradition of unlimited debate.”25 Rather, it has
been transformed into an “everyday partisan tool used simply to
delay – or worse, as a minority veto.”26 Filibuster threats have spiked
exponentially over the last decade. The 110th Congress experienced a
record 139 motions to invoke cloture filed.27 This trend continued in
the 111th Congress, with the filing of 136 motions to invoke cloture.28
Unsurprisingly, no bill passed the 111th Congress without a full sixtyvote majority in the Senate.29 Moreover, many bills that had full sixtyvote support failed to pass due to the scarcity of available floor time
caused by the constant invocation of cloture.30 The threat of filibusters
has stayed constant in the 112th Congress, with eighty motions to
invoke cloture filed through the end of March 2012, roughly halfway
through the session.31 As a comparison, only twenty cloture motions
were filed between 1950 and 1969.32
In this era of entrenched partisanship, the filibuster has evolved into
a tool of pure obstruction rather than nuanced dissent. As in times past,
it appears that the filibuster is due for another round of reforms. The
primary question now becomes – will these reforms be accomplished?
Id.
See id. at R. XIX (“No Senator shall interrupt another Senator in debate without his consent.”).
24
See Richard Beth & Stanley Bach, Cong. Research Serv. RL 30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the
Senate 20 (2003) (showing that a typical cloture invocation takes 15 calendar days to realize).
25
See Fisk, supra note 8, at 185 (explaining the function of the modern filibuster).
26
See Udall, supra note 7, at 118 (providing the opinion of the one hundred current senators).
27
Id. at 121.
28
Brian Beutler, 111th Senate Breaks a Filibuster Record, Talking Points Memo (Nov. 30, 2011, 5:00 PM),
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/12/111th-senate-breaks-one-filibuster-record.php.
29
Jonathan Bernstein, Six Key Filibuster Facts for the 112th Congress, The New Republic (Nov. 30, 2011,
5:06 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/80760/six-key-filibuster-facts-the-112th-congress.
30
Id.
31
United States Senate, Cloture Motions – 112th Congress, (Jan. 5, 2011-March 30, 2012), available at
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/112.shtml.
32
See Tom Harkin, Fixing the Filibuster: Real Democracy in the Senate, 95 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 67, 68
(2010).
22
23
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II. Hard Reforms
The filibuster is uniquely positioned within a body of rules that are
both completely flexible yet stubbornly tenacious.33 While the filibuster
has undergone a number of changes over the years, both Republicans
and Democrats have vigorously defended its existence.34 Therefore,
the filibuster is unlikely to go away in its entirety. As such, proposals
for reform must be pragmatic, both in their effect on filibuster abuse
and their likelihood of being enacted in the current political climate.
This Article will now examine three possibilities for hard rule reform,
and several options for soft reform, to determine their potential for
enactment and efficacy in fixing the rampant filibuster abuse of the last
decade.
A. The “Nuclear” Option
The “nuclear” option is as extreme as it sounds, effectively ending
the existence of the filibuster by a simple majority vote at the beginning of a new Congress.35 This option refers to the procedure by which
a simple majority is able to change the rules before the rules are “reenacted” at the beginning of a new Congress.36 Such an approach would
circumvent the filibuster because no rules technically exist until the
Senate re-enacts the old rules.37 This rule change would not necessarily eliminate the filibuster. The exercise of the “nuclear option” could
See U.S.Const. art. I, § 5 (giving full control over procedural rules to the respective houses of
Congress); see also Standing Rules of the Senate, R.V (2011) (“The rules of the Senate shall continue
from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.”).
34
See Fisk, supra note 8 at 185-209 (describing the evolution of the filibuster from 1790 to present);
compare Manu Raju, McConnell Defends the Filibuster, Politico (Dec. 1, 2011, 12:14 PM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0810/40694.html (quoting current Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
as supporting the use of the filibuster to protect minority rights), with Jesse Holland, Reid Defends
Filibusters Over Judicial Nominees, Athens Banner-Herald, Apr. 10, 2005, http://onlineathens.com/
stories/041005/new_20050410070.shtml (quoting then Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid defending
the use of the filibuster to uniformly block 10 Republican judicial nominees).
35
See William Safire, Nuclear Options, N.Y. Times, March 20, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/03/20/magazine/20ONLANGUAGE.html?_r=1 (describing the origin of the term “nuclear
option” in March 2003). Proponents of the approach often refer to it as the “constitutional option.” See
generally Gold, supra note 8.
36
The “nuclear” option can legally be invoked at any point and is not limited exclusively to the beginning of a new Congress. See Gold, supra note 8, at 260-62 (giving an example of how the nuclear option can be invoked during a session of the Senate). For purposes of this paper, the focus of an invocation of the nuclear option will be limited to the beginning of a new Congress as that is the most likely
time such a measure could see enactment due to the political and partisan implications of exercising
the nuclear option mid-session. See, e.g., id. at 260-69 (giving examples of procedural fights similar to
the invocation of the nuclear option but never quite reaching full implementation).
37
See Udall, supra note 7, at 130-32 (describing the procedure and legal justification in carrying out reform under the nuclear option); see generally Gold, supra note 8 (explaining the exercise of the nuclear
option and noting that while the “nuclear” option can also be exercised at any point during a Senate
session, pursuing that course of action engages a more complex set of procedures that would result in
the same outcome).
33
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implement any reform, as it would merely give power to the majority
to dictate new rules. This proposal is contentious for two reasons. First,
its use would likely result in unilateral, single-party changes to longstanding Senate procedure. Second, there is still great disagreement
amongst both scholars and senators over the option’s legality.
Individual senators stand for election on a rolling basis, meaning
that, with the exception of special elections and vacancies, only onethird of the Senate is ever up for election at a given time.38 Thus, many
argue that the Senate is a “continuing body” that is never truly “new”
due to the automatic retention of two-thirds of its members every
election cycle.39 Combining this “continuing body” theory with the
language of Senate Rule V, which states that “[t]he rules of the Senate
shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they
are changed as provided in these rules,”40 creates the argument that
any proposed change to the filibuster rules could itself be filibustered
because the filibuster is still inherent in the “continued” rules.41
Many proponents of the nuclear option disagree with the “continuing body” theory on the grounds that the binding nature of the theory
is unconstitutional entrenchment.42 Opponents of the “continuing
body” theory, among them Senator Tom Udall (D-NM), argue that the
language of the Constitution makes clear that the rules can be changed
by a simple majority.43 Senator Udall points to the language of Article I,
Section 5 of the Constitution as evidence that the explicit language preempts any argument that a super-majority is required to change the
Senate Rules.44 Article I, Section 5 states that “[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
In 2012, twenty-two Democrats (six retiring), ten Republicans (three retiring), and two
Independents (one retiring) are up for re-election as of April 2012. The senators up for re-election
are Sen. Brown (D-OH), Sen. Manchin (D-WV), Sen. Cantwell (D-WA), Sen. Cardin (D-MD), Sen.
Carper (D-DE), Sen. Casey (D-PA), Sen. Feinstein (D-CA), Sen. Gillibrand (D-NY), Sen. Klobuchar
(D-MN), Sen. McCaskill (D-MO), Sen. Menendez (D-NJ), Sen. Nelson (D-FL), Sen. Stabenow (D-MI),
Sen. Tester, (D-MT), Sen. Whitehouse (D-RI), Sen. Brown (R-MA), Sen. Barrasso (R-WY), Sen. Corker
(R-TN), Sen. Heller (R-NV), Sen. Hatch (R-UT), Sen. Lugar (R-IN), Sen. Wicker (R-MI), Sen. Sanders (IVT). The senators that are retiring in 2012 are Sen. Akaka (D-HI), Sen. Bingaman (D-NM), Sen. Conrad
(D-ND), Sen. Kohl (D-WI), Sen. Nelson (D-NE), Sen. Webb (D-VA), Sen. Hutchison (R-TX), Sen. Kyl
(R-AZ), Sen. Snowe (R-ME), and Sen. Lieberman (I-CT).
39
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1401,
1404-06 (2010) (describing the “continuing” nature of the Senate’s election timing and discussing the
legal implications).
40
Standing Rules of the Senate, R.V (2011).
41
See Udall, supra note 7 at 125-26 (explaining the problems of entrenchment caused by this interpretation of the rules).
42
See, e.g., Udall, supra note 7; Bruhl, supra note 39; Orrin Hatch, Crisis Mode: A Fair and Constitutional
Option to Beat the Filibuster Game, National Review Online (Dec 1, 2011, 6:18 PM), http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/hatch200501120729.asp (arguing that the “continuing body” language was only
added in 1959 and therefore could not be considered binding on all past and future Congress’).
43
See Udall, supra note 7 at 127-28.
44
Id.
38
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Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”45
Senator Udall contends that because expulsion explicitly requires a
two-thirds majority, while the rules are simply to be “determined,” one
cannot impute anything more than a simple majority requirement onto
the creation and adjustment of the Senate rules.46 To hold otherwise,
argues Senator Udall, is to effectively allow one Congress to bind all
future Congresses to a new way in which to amend the rules, contrary
to the express language of the Constitution.47
The Supreme Court, to the extent it has addressed the issue, seemingly agrees with Senator Udall.48 In determining whether a Congress
can bind future Congresses, the Supreme Court has stated that “each
subsequent legislature has equal power to legislate upon the same
subject,”49 and that “[e]very succeeding legislature possesses the same
jurisdiction and power . . . as its predecessors. The latter [must] have
the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of
enactment, neither more nor less.”50 Numerous legal scholars have cast
their voices in support of the aged, but unchallenged Supreme Court
precedent.51 Many have testified to Congress that to allow rule changes
seeking to address the filibuster to be filibustered is unconstitutional
entrenchment of the first order.52
However, even assuming arguendo that the Senate could change the
rules and eliminate the filibuster by a simple majority vote, the likelihood of such an action is low. As much as they may decry it, senators
from both major parties understand that the threat of filibuster and
obstruction is one of the few powers possessed by the minority to
oppose the legislative agenda of the majority.53 Eliminating or handicapping the filibuster would be pleasant for the party in power only as
long as it retains power. However, as soon as the power balance shifts,
the legislative agenda will shift with it, likely undoing much of the
opposing party’s legislative accomplishments and emboldening a parU.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
See Udall, supra note 7, at 127.
47
Id.
48
See Udall, supra note 7, at 128 (summarizing Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of legislative
entrenchment); see also Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sprately, 172 U.S. 602 (1899) (stating that a
legislature must retain the right to update its laws and cannot be bound by the acts of past legislatures); Newton v. Mahonin Cnty. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548 (1879) (holding that a legislative act that
“permanently established” a new position could not be read as permanent as it would unconstitutionally bind future legislatures).
49
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172. U.S. at 621.
50
Newton, 100 U.S. at 559.
51
See Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is Denied Its Right to Consent:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 31-33 (2003).
52
See id.
53
See Mimi Marziani, Filibuster Abuse 5-7 (Brennan Center for Justice 2010) (explaining how the
modern filibuster creates a sixty vote Senate).
45
46
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tisan agenda devoid of compromise. Considering the unprecedented
partisanship and obstructionism exhibited by recent Congresses,
coupled with the heightened party rancor during this election year, it is
possible that if the Senate shifts party control in 2012, the Republicans
would invoke the nuclear option to change the filibuster.54
It is unlikely that the Republicans would seek complete elimination,
especially if President Obama were to win re-election, but it would be
reasonable to expect them to change the filibuster and limit its effectiveness. Full-fledged elimination of the filibuster would be disastrous,
as it would catalyze the partisan vitriol that has been building over the
last decade by enabling one side to slam through its legislative agenda
in an effort to entrench as much legislation as possible before losing
control. This “alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge” is an evil that was warned against as far
back as George Washington’s farewell address.55
For example, if Republicans retake the Senate in the 2012 election
and succeed in a nuclear elimination of the filibuster, they could undo
the entirety of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,56 at a tremendous cost to the federal and state governments.57 Realistically, one
could expect Democrats to re-enact similar legislation when they next
return to power, and repeat this back and forth ad nauseum. The harmful effects of such a schizophrenic policy are obvious. The increased
fusion between the legislative bodies would nullify the checking purpose of the Senate espoused by the nation’s founders and allow for the
entirety of the legislative branch to work in political unison, with no
restraint on the implementation of single-party agendas.58 The resulting volatility in legislation would cause tremendous upheaval every
time party power in Washington shifts and would lead great economic
loss as government agencies would need to implement and then undo
programs.
The aforementioned reasons make the nuclear option the least
likely solution to come to fruition. Although the filibuster is abhorred
for its political obstructionism, it is understood to be a necessary proSee Udall, supra note 7, at 116.
George Washington, Farewell Address (1796) (warning against the use of political factions to enact
revenge against political opponents following elections).
56
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
57
See David Herszenhorn, In Battle Over Health Law, Math Cuts Both Ways, N.Y. Times”,
Jan. 7, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/health/policy/08cong.html (citing
the cost of repeal to be $230 billion); see also House Republicans Vote to Overturn ObamaCare in
Symbolic Vote, Fox News, Dec. 1, 2011, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/19/
house-poised-vote-health-law-repeal.
58
See The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison) (calling the structure of the Senate an “advantage” due
to its ability to act as an “impediment” against “improper acts of legislation” and noting that it would
counteract the “impulse of sudden and violent passions,” and the “seduc[tion] by factious leaders
into intemperate and pernicious resolutions”).
54
55

Legislation & Policy Brief

137

tection of minority interests within the procedural rules of the Senate.
The problem is inherent in the way that the filibuster is used, not necessarily in the mechanism itself.59 Therefore, a more pragmatic approach
would be to target the effectiveness or potential uses of the filibuster,
potentially through reform that is more limited, or through leadership
compromises. Eliminating or unilaterally reforming the filibuster in one
fell swoop will cause political bedlam, as the system would overcorrect
repeatedly in an effort to adjust to a procedural system with a newly
limited ability to truly slow the pace of legislation. Although it may
someday disappear, the filibuster should make a phased exit, agreed
to by both parties, in order to allow the political system to adjust to its
gradual passing.
B. The “One-Bite” Reform
A less extreme version of hard filibuster rule reform would leave
the filibuster intact while limiting its uses. The proposal would allow
only a single filibuster per bill, removing the ability of senators to take
“multiple bites at the delay apple.”60 Currently, a bill making its way
through the Senate can be filibustered multiple times on procedural
grounds before coming to a vote.61 In order for a bill to come up for
debate on the floor, the Senate must vote on a motion to proceed, which
can be filibustered.62 If cloture is invoked, then the bill transitions to the
floor for debate.63 The Senate must then agree to end debate and move
to a vote.64 This too can be filibustered, requiring an entirely new cloture procedure.65 To compound this procedural inefficiency, senators
can propose and then filibuster amendments to a bill, further dragging
out their efforts to delay.66
The “one bite at the apple” proposal would transform the filibuster
from a repetitive and obstructionist tool to a one-time effort at stopping
a bill the old-fashioned way, by endless debate carried out in person.
Today, the mere threat of filibuster is enough to derail legislation due
to the multitude of ways in which a senator can indefinitely delay a
bill’s progress, costing precious floor time.67 The “one bite” reform
See, e.g., Marziani, supra note 53, at 1-10 (describing the problems caused by filibuster misuse and
abuse).
60
Norman Ornstein, Time to Reassess Filibuster to Keep Senate Functioning, Roll Call,
Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-public-opinion/legislative/
time-to-reassess-filibuster-to-keep-senate-functioning.
61
See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
62
Id.
63
See Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXII (2).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate
34 (2010).
67
See Ornstein, supra note 60.
59
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would decrease the potential for obstructionism in Congress without
eliminating the filibuster’s original purpose by limiting any senator’s
ability to indefinitely stall a bill through the use of multiple filibusters.68
Although this reform appears sensible on its face, it may encounter
a great deal of opposition due to its severe curtailment of the modern
filibuster’s primary purpose of pure obstruction.69 While this would be
beneficial for the state of American politics, the reform will likely result
in a large fight intended to prevent enactment. Thus, it is more likely
that this reform would come from a split Congress than a Congress
with a single party holding dominance. Moreover, the parties would
likely agree to do a phased enactment of the limited filibuster, which
would slowly decrease the number of filibusters per bill over time to
allow senators to see how the reform changes the political climate.
Alternatively, they may set a future date for full enactment to give both
parties plenty of forewarning.
Even with this reform in place, the minority party could still wield
the threat of filibuster offensively to obstruct the majority’s legislative
agenda because even a single filibuster on a bill could cost weeks of
time.70 If the minority were to continue to threaten to filibuster every
single bill and nomination, then the current level of obstructionism
may hold constant. However, if the majority leadership were to call the
minority’s bluff and force it to actually follow-through on its filibuster
threats, the consistency of obstruction would likely decrease, as the
minority party would be unlikely to expend the political will and capital to fight every bill and nomination publicly and on the record. The
“one-bite” reform would allow the majority to force filibusters because
of the guarantee that there could only be one filibuster per bill. By forcing filibusters to actually occur, the majority party would compel the
minority party to choose what issues are worth engaging in a true filibuster for.71 Ideally, this would result in a gradual de-escalation of the
filibuster’s use as a tool of obstruction while retaining the opportunity
for the minority to prove a political point or stop a bill if it deemed it
absolutely necessary. Limiting filibusters to one-per-bill would chop
wholesale obstructionism at the knees and return the filibuster to its
role as a focused exercise of dissent rather than a politically convenient
tool for obstruction.

See Fisk, supra note 8, at 185-90 (describing the early usage of the filibuster).
See Marziani, supra note 53, at 1-10 (giving examples of the filibuster’s use for obstruction and not to
foster greater debate).
70
See Beth, supra note 23, at 20 (noting that the average cloture motion takes 15 calendar days to
realize).
71
See Ornstein, supra note 60 (“If a minority feels intensely enough about some things, its Members
should be sleeping on cots in hallways and disrupting their schedules and lives to make its point.”).
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C. Diminishing Returns
The final and perhaps most pragmatic of the proposals is a filibuster system based on diminishing returns. This proposal mirrors the
one submitted by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) in the 110th Congress.72
Under Harkin’s proposal, senators would still be allowed to engage
in filibusters at will, but the process of invoking cloture would be
transformed.73 The first cloture motion on a bill would still require the
sixty-vote super-majority.74 However, if the majority were to fail to get
sixty votes, debate would be allowed to continue for two more days, at
which point a second cloture motion could be brought to a vote.75 This
second motion would require only fifty-seven votes to end debate.76
This process would be repeatable until a fourth and final cloture vote
would require only fifty-one votes.77
While this proposal would still allow for a bill to be delayed tremendously and for general obstructionism to continue to stifle the majority
of Senate business, it would address the issue of what has effectively
become the “minority veto,” which enables the minority party to prevent the passage of legislation favored by up to fifty-nine members of
the Senate.78 Allowing the majority party to force an issue until cloture
is sure to be invoked mitigates the potential for the minority party to
indefinitely stall a popular piece of legislation while retaining its ability
to win the votes of members in the majority through reasoned debate.
This approach would not prevent the minority from filibustering
any and all measures proposed by the majority party. Rather, it would
create a realistic opportunity for the majority to push through legislation that it believes truly felt merits passage, albeit at the high cost of
Senate floor time. With the current Senate standard seeming to require
sixty votes for passage of any legislation, this reform would allow for
more proactive legislating by providing a method by which to prevent
a single individual from effectively vetoing a piece of legislation that
has overwhelming majority support.79
Moreover, this reform is likely to be seen as the most practical option
to implement as it retains the filibuster’s traditional purpose of being
used as a debate tool intended to convince the opposing party, or the
American people, that a particular piece of legislation is ill-informed
See S. Res. 416, 110th Cong. (2010); see also Harkin, supra note 32, at 76-78.
See Harkin, supra note 32, at 76-78.
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See Marziani, supra note 53, at 7 (quoting several Congressmen lamenting the power of the “minority veto” and explaining the effect it has on representative democracy).
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or misguided.80 Because the reform retains the ability to obstruct and
stifle even very popular bills for an extended period, it requires neither
side to unilaterally disarm. Implementation of this type of reform is
unlikely to happen when a single party holds fifty-five or more seats.
As with the “one-bite” reform,81 a split Senate would be required to put
this sort of reform into play because it would guarantee that neither
side would be able to use it to great advantage in the reform’s maiden
Congress.
Adoption of a system of diminishing returns on a filibuster will
do nothing to address the issues of a congressional minority focused
exclusively on obstruction.82 However, it will be a step in the right
direction in terms of allowing a strong majority to pass legislation it
deems a priority while simultaneously showing that reforming the filibuster does not eliminate the minority protections that are considered
so sacrosanct. This reform may be a first-step in addressing the issue of
the filibuster, with the next logical extension being the implementation
of a “one-bite” theory to further mitigate the modern filibuster’s capacity for wholesale obstruction.83
III. Soft Reform and Handshake Compromise
Reforming the Senate Rules is unquestionably difficult and contentious, and thus it comes as no surprise that the filibuster has only
been reformed a handful of times since its inception.84 The more direct
alternative to engaging in a fight over the rules is compromise and
coordination between majority and minority leadership in the Senate.85
These “handshake agreements” allow senators to avoid fighting over
rules while still engaging in pragmatic compromises that seek to make
the upper chamber more efficient.
At the start of the 112th Congress, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell came to an agreement to avoid engaging in hard filibuster rules reform. Instead, they
See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 8, at 188-89 (describing the early use of the filibuster to protect civil rights
and prevent a tyranny of the majority by describing the impacts of a law through filibuster); Gold,
supra note 8, at 216-18 (describing the reasoning and use of the early filibusters to engage in protest
debates and to force compromise).
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that his number one priority is “to deny President Obama a second term in office”).
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(describing an agreement between Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Senate Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell to avoid filibuster reform by adopting an informal set of rule changes).
80

Legislation & Policy Brief

141

relied on a number of smaller changes such as the elimination of
“secret holds,” the reduction of nominated positions requiring Senate
approval, and an agreement that Republicans “limit their filibusters of
motions to begin debate.”86 These sorts of agreements go a long way
towards creating comity between the parties. However, some see them
as kicking the can down the road.87 Senator Udall took to the floor to
speak out against the compromise, arguing that if “we hadn’t utilized
our rights under the Constitution, if we hadn’t pushed this very hard
and said we are trying to round up fifty-one senators that will stand up
with us and say we want change in this institution,” there would not
have even been a discussion about addressing filibuster abuse, much
less the potential for true reform.88 Pundits noted that the agreement
between Senators Reid and McConnell to bench talk of filibuster reform
ensures that “the minority is not on notice that further abuse of the
filibuster (and associated stalling tactics) could lead to more significant
reforms.”89 This certainly seems to have been the takeaway from the
agreement, as Republicans have continued their obstruction unabated.
They have matched the record-breaking paces of the 110th and 111th
Congresses, with roughly half of cloture motions submitted to break
filibuster threats made on motions to proceed, despite the agreement
with Senator Reid.90
This is not to suggest that agreements among leadership are useless. Quite to the contrary, the agreement between Senators Reid and
McConnell showed that when facing down the threat of a unilateral
engagement of the nuclear option to reform the filibuster, both sides
could come to the table to address the issue. The future of the current
agreement still remains to be seen. The agreement is non-binding, and,
were Senator McConnell and the Republicans to retake the Senate
decisively in the 2012 election, nothing would stop them from reneging on the agreement and going nuclear on eliminating the filibuster
as soon as the Democrats are in the minority. However, putting this
doomsday hypothetical aside, the agreement between the two parties
demonstrates that there is potential for testing out harder rule reforms
through non-binding agreements between leadership.
For example, if the 113th Senate turns out evenly split, Senators
Reid and McConnell, or their successors, could agree that their parties
would work to limit filibuster threats to one per bill, effectively enactId.
See Greg Sargent, Did Reid and McConnell just doom future filibuster reform?, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2011,
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ing the “one bite” reform discussed above.91 This would allow the parties to test out the efficacy of such a reform without formalizing it in the
rules. Moreover, if one party felt that it was being treated unfairly, the
non-binding agreement would allow them an easy out. Similarly, the
non-binding nature of the agreement allows any single senator to throw
a wrench in the works by refusing to play by the informal agreements
made amongst party leadership. Whether there are any consequences
to breaking these “handshake agreements” will remain to be seen in
the remainder of the 112th Congress and the beginning of the 113th
Congress. Should the agreements be successful and potentially lead to
a decrease in the number of cloture motions needing to be invoked,
perhaps the parties will be more willing to experiment with further
reforms to help deescalate the partisanship in Washington.
Conclusion
Claiming that there is a single fix-all for our ever-dysfunctional
Congress is unrealistic. The elected representatives who make up
Congress represent a diverse and partisan populace that adamantly
promotes and defends often diametrically opposite ideas of good governance. That said, implementing reforms, whether through formal
reform or informal agreements that would force Congress to do its job
by eliminating the availability of procedural gimmicks would go a long
way toward restoring some faith in our legislative branch.
As the 113th Congress prepares to make its inaugural trip to
Washington, one of the first questions facing the new Senate will be
whether, and how, to take up the question of reforming the atmosphere
and procedures in Congress’ most deliberative body. After examining three recently proposed hard rule reforms to amend the Senate’s
filibuster procedures, as well as soft reforms such as compromise and
leadership agreements, it seems clear that it is unlikely under the current leadership, save for an egregious breach of the current handshake
agreement. If the agreement should fail and hard rule changes do
become the chosen format for reform, they will need to be gradual and
will likely require an effectively split Senate for enactment.
Neither party wants to unilaterally disarm by giving up the ability
to filibuster, so non-nuclear reforms must take the form of restrictions
on the filibuster’s use and create opportunities to overcome even the
most adamant of filibuster efforts. For the foregoing reasons, both the
“one-bite” and “diminishing returns” reforms discussed above are
the most feasible for implementation by a Congress in the near future.
Ultimately, it may take the Republicans returning to power and experiencing the wholesale obstruction they are currently visiting upon the
91
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Democrats to come to an appreciation for the need to reform the filibuster rules. If and when both parties come around to understanding
that blanket obstructionism is no way to govern, they will find several
options that will neutralize abuses intended to obstruct while still
retaining the opportunity for the minority party to make their impassioned dissent known.

